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Charitable Immunity: The Plague of Modern
Tort Concepts
Ronald M. Lipson*
USTICE CARDOZO once said: "Law is indeed, an historical
growth, for it is an expression of customary morality which
develops silently and unconsciously from one age to another." 1
His view was that if a rule continues to work an injustice, it
should be retested and must eventually be reformed. This func-
tion of law comes to mind when one considers the tort liability
of charitable institutions.
It is a general principle of tort law that liability is the re-
sult of negligent and tortious conduct,2 and that a wrongdoer
must be held accountable to the injured party. Some exceptions
to this principle developed. Thus, certain defendants were
given immunity from liability for conduct which would other-
wise be tortious.3 This immunity was given in order to protect
the defendant himself or interests of social importance which
he represented.
Among these "favorites" of the law have been, and still are
to some extent, charitable institutions. Immunity for charities
has come under much criticism in recent years. As one eminent
authority said:
To require an injured party to forego his cause of
action for the wrongful acts of another when he is other-
wise entitled thereto because the injury was committed by
charity, is to require him to make an unreasonable con-
tribution to charity against his will, and a rule of law im-
posing such burdens cannot be regarded as socially de-
sirable nor consistent with sound policy.4
*B.B.A., Adelbert College of Western Reserve Univ.; LL.B., West. Res.
Univ. School of Law (June 1958).
[Editors' Note: This article won First Prize in the annual Sindell Tort
Prize Competition at W. R. U. School of Law for 1957-8. A similar Sindell
prize at Cleveland-Marshall Law School for 1957-8 was won by Dr. Carl E.
Wasmuth (Editor-in-Chief of this Review) with his article entitled "Court
Dictation of Choice of Anesthesia," published in 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. (3) 461
(September 1957).]
1 Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process 104 (1921).
2 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 762, 267 Pac. 2d 934, 942
(1954).
3 Prosser, Torts 770 (2d ed. 1955).
4 Harper, Torts 657 (4th ed. 1940).
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For many years, the majority of American courts held that
charities were immune from tort liability. It is ironical that this
doctrine took hold in the United States. First pronounced in
1876, in a Massachusetts decision,5 it was based on dicta from
some early English cases, none of which dealt with tort liability
of non-governmental charities. But in 1871, England had already
repudiated the immunity rule.6
Thus, the Massachusetts court established this non-liability
principle in total ignorance of the prior English rejection. A
decade later, a Maryland court7 followed the first American
decision, and immunity was well on its way to becoming firmly
entrenched in American tort concepts. Yet the courts them-
selves could not agree on the reasons justifying immunity. An
Oklahoma court expressed this confusion in Gable v. Salvation
Army," when it stated:
Even the most cursory research makes it apparent that
there is no ground upon which the doctrine of non liability
has been rested by one court that has not been assailed and
criticized at length by some other court, notwithstanding the
fact that they arrive at the same conclusion.9
The doctrine has been in a state of flux in recent years, and
the trend is definitely away from immunity. Professor Prosser
in 1955 predicted with confidence that immunity would be ex-
tinct in another decade.10 It is believed that this trend is in the
right direction.
It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the grounds upon
which charitable institutions have been granted immunity from
tort liability, to consider changing conditions and concepts affect-
ing immunity, and finally, to discuss the extent to which the
immunity exception should be abandoned.
Theories Supporting Immunity
The earliest theory followed in this country is known as
the "trust fund" theory. It is based on the idea that the funds
of a charity are held in trust for the beneficiaries of that trust,
5 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am.
Rep. 529 (1876).
6 Foreman v. Canterbury Corp., L. R. 6 Q. B. 214 (1871); Mersey Docks
Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 H. L. Cas. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866).
7 Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1895).
8 186 Okla. 687, 100 P. 2d 244 (1940).
9 Id. at 689, 100 Pac. 2d at 246.
10 Prosser, Torts 788 (2d ed. 1955). See also, Oleck, Non-Profit Corpora-
tions and Associations, Secs. 56-58 (1956).
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and that to use these funds for anything other than the original
purpose would defeat the donor's purpose and reduce the funds
accordingly.
Fallacies and inconsistencies in this theory come to mind.
If this theory were carried through in its entirety, it would bar
everyone from recovery against a charity. Yet, even in those
states basing immunity on this theory, beneficiaries were the
only class consistently barred from recovery, while strangers to
the institutions could often recover." Certainly, the funds are
depleted to the same extent whenever tort damages are paid out,
regardless of the class of persons to which the injured person
belongs!
In addition, it has been held that a donor of the charity has
no intention generally of exempting his donation from tort
claims.1 2 Even if such an intent were present, a donor probably
has no such power under the law. Thus, in Cohen v. General
Hospital Soc. of Connecticut," the court stated that immunity
from tort liability for charitable associations cannot be based
only on the fact that its funds are held in trust.
Moreover, immunity is inconsistent with the usual rules
concerning trust funds. These have been held subject to tort
claims based on the negligence of carefully selected servants, al-
though judgment must first be obtained against the trustee. 4
The end result is the same as if the trust itself were held liable
from the beginning. Hence, the general law of trusts affords no
basis of immunity to charities solely because of its character as
a trust.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, persons must
answer for the torts of their agents while acting in an agency
capacity. 15 Yet many courts have closed their eyes to this com-
monly accepted legal concept and have exempted charities from
liability for their servants' torts. These courts, apparently de-
sirous of reaching a certain result for no valid reason other than
that the defendant is a charity, simply state that respondeat
superior does not apply. Sometimes the courts refer to con-
" Medical and Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, 229 S. W. 2d 932
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
12 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810
(D. C. Cir. 1942).
13 113 Conn. 188, 154 A. 435 (1931).
14 Silva v. Providence Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1939).
15 Mecham, Agency 237 (4th ed. 1952).
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siderations of "public policy," and thus the desired conclusion
is reached.
Other courts reason that a charity does not derive profits
from the services of its employees, whereas an ordinary master
derives financial benefit from his agent's services.16 This dis-
tinction is not sound. Respondeat superior is based not on
whether the master profits by the services, but on the extent of
control which he exercises over his employees.
17
The best reason, though, for rejecting this theory of immu-
nity was given in a 1940 Florida case.' 8 The court stated that
the doctrine of respondeat superior was so much a part of "due
process of law" as to require its recognition in cases of this kind
in the absence of legislation to the contrary. The whole area of
charitable immunity was originally a matter of judicial, rather
than legislative, decision. This fact alone would warrant the
application of respondeat superior to charities.
Many of the courts in deciding the liability of charitable in-
stitutions have reached results in between the extremes of abso-
lute immunity and liability based on fault. Accordingly, peculiar
degrees of immunity have arisen in various states. New York,
for instance, until recently, provided one of the more important
peculiarities. Its courts held that the respondeat superior doc-
trine was not applicable when the charity was a non-profit hos-
pital and the employee was a doctor or nurse. Thus, a partial
immunity was decreed only in the particular situation de-
scribed. Such an employee was considered to be an independent
contractor whenever performing professional or "medical" acts.
The hospital where these acts were performed was not liable
for torts committed by these named persons. This rule was set
down in the landmark case of Schloendorff v. Soc. of N. Y.
Hospital.19 The reasoning behind this rule was that the hospital
itself does not undertake to heal, but merely to make healers
available.
Pitfalls of the New York rule come to mind. It is difficult
under this theory to strictly distinguish a "medical" and an
"administrative" act, the latter subjecting the hospital to liability
if done negligently or tortiously. Situations can and do arise
16 Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc., 218 Wis. 169, 260 N. W. 476
(1935).
17 Lichty v. Carbon County Agricultural Ass'n., 31 F. Supp. 809, 811 (D. C.
Pa. 1940).
18 Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 S. 344 (1940).
19 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914).
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when a doctor or nurse performs "administrative" functions.
The question then arises whether or not the hospital would be
liable in such situations. Or, on the other hand, would the
hospital be immune where a qualified "administrative" worker
performs a "medical" act on the theory that he too acted as an
independent contractor?
The Schloendorff rule had been in effect since 1914. In re-
cent years, many legal writers, and the New York courts them-
selves, questioned the validity of this hospital immunity doc-
trine. This doubt was resolved to some extent when the New
York Court of Appeals in a 1956 case stated its belief that the
"medical-administrative" distinction had "outlived its useful-
ness," at least, "in the case of physicians and nurses who are
salaried members of the hospitals' personnel rather than outside
professionals." 20 In that decision, the defendant-hospital was
held liable for the act of its salaried blood technician who had
performed a "medical" act in negligently making a blood test
resulting in the death of the plaintiff's fetus.
Then in Becker v. City of New York,21 decided in 1957, a
city hospital was held liable for the negligent act of an employee
nurse while performing a "medical" act. The court expressed
further dissatisfaction with the New York doctrine. Thus the
respondeat superior doctrine was applied to hold the city liable
for the acts of employees even "medical" as well as "administra-
tive" in nature.
The highest court in New York completely abandoned the
last remnant of hospital immunity in the state in the case of
Bing v. Thunig22 decided only months ago. In rejecting the in-
dependent contractor idea both as to charitable and profit-mak-
ing hospitals, the court stated that such a concept was "out of
time with the life about us. .. ."
Until 1956, Ohio followed a rule of partial immunity. This
policy was set down by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1911 when
it was held that a hospital was immune from the usual applica-
tion of respondeat superior because "public policy encouraged
this type of charitable association." 23 The scope of the Ohio
immunity rule was later limited to beneficiaries of the charity.
24
20 Berg v. N. Y. Society for Relief of Ruptured and Crippled, 1 N. Y. 2d
499, 136 N. E. 2d 523 (1956).
21 2 N. Y. 2d 226, 140 N. E. 2d 262 (1957).
22 2 N. Y. 2d 656, 143 N. E. 2d 3 (1957).
23 Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n., 85 0. S. 90, 96 N. E. 1089 (1911).
24 Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 123 0. S. 52, 173 N. E. 737 (1930).
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In other words, Ohio had followed a partial immunity doctrine-
respondeat superior was ignored if the plaintiff was a beneficiary
of the charity, but not if he was a "stranger."
Another theory used by the courts to circumvent liability
for charitable institutions is known as the "implied waiver" or
"assumption of risk" theory. This view is applied only when
the plaintiff is a beneficiary of the charity. Without stating why,
the proponents of the view simply assume that one who accepts
the benefits of a charity impliedly waives liability or assumes
the risk of negligence in general,25 or specifically, the negligence
of an employee.2 6
This theory is illogical.27 A waiver is based generally on a
voluntary act of giving up a known right. An Arizona court,
rejecting this theory, stated:
The theory of implied waiver . . . is so thoroughly il-
logical that it is difficult to understand how it has gained
the approval of any court. It not only denies the very in-
dividuals for whom the charity was intended, the benefit
of the charity, but it makes it compulsory upon him, if in-
jured by the negligence of an employee, to donate to charity
the amount he would otherwise be entitled to recover. 2s
The irony of upholding such a theory was expressed by the same
court when it mentioned the fact that the saving to the charity
from such exemption may in turn be used to satisfy the judg-
ment of a stranger for injuries which he may have sustained
as a result of the same act of negligence.
One who has availed himself of the services of a charity
does just that and no more; he agrees to accept the kindness
offered by the institution, but does not knowingly waive liability
for the charity's negligence. Rather than an immunity, a duty
arises on the part of the charity. Like the Good Samaritan who
is under no duty to act, once he volunteers, he must act with
care or otherwise be subject to tort liability.
An unconscious or very ill hospital patient cannot impliedly
waive his claim for negligence. One court said that such a
patient "does not haggle about terms; he expects care not care-
lessness." 29 Likewise, neither can it be said that a small child
25 Winslow v. Veterans of Foreign Wars National Home, 328 Mich. 488, 44
N. W. 2d 19 (1950).
26 Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785 (1921).
27 Prosser, Torts 785 (2d ed. 1955).
28 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 31, 230 P. 2d 220, 226 (1951).




in attending a church service knowingly waived the right to
recover for negligence.30 In fact, persons lacking legal capacity
cannot generally give consent at all, and especially consent to
waive claims for negligence.
This theory is based upon nothing but the assumption of an
implied contract against future negligence.3' And that assump-
tion is debatable and another "rationalization" which the courts
have deemed necessary to justify a desired result.
Admittedly, governmental agencies are immune from tort
liability under one of the recognized exceptions to the general
tort liability.32 A few courts have reasoned that since these
charitable institutions perform some of the same functions of
the state and its agencies, they too should be given the same
immunity. A Connecticut court, in determining whether a hos-
pital set up by the state legislature was liable in tort, admitted
that the defendant was a public charity in the popular sense of
the term. However, although it was more closely allied with
government than the usual defendant claiming immunity on this
basis, in that it was a legislative creation, and received aid from
the state by way of exemption from taxation and by state appro-
priation toward its support, nevertheless, the court held it not
to be acting as a state agency. The distinction seemed to rest on
the fact that while the benefits it bestows were public, its or-
ganization and management were private. 33
To some extent, in light of our modern welfare concepts,
every function of a charitable institution substitutes for what
would otherwise be a governmental responsibility, and there-
fore every charity is acting as or in lieu of a state agency. To
blindly apply this doctrine would be to give absolute immunity
categorically.
It is interesting to note that charitable immunity decisions
based on this theory are generally early-1900 cases, decided at a
time when charities existed to aid in the performance of govern-
mental or public duties and when governments either could not
or would not, believing that the responsibility was not theirs,
perform these same functions. As a passing comment, it is well
to remember that in many cases, even governmental units, while
30 Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 132, 70 A. 2d 230, 235
(1950).
31 Id. at 133, 70 A. 2d at 235.
32 Prosser, Torts 774 (2d ed. 1955).
33 See note 13 supra.
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enjoying immunity from tort liability, have nevertheless fre-
quently accepted responsibility for such liability.
Public policy has been described by one court as fluctuating
and varying with customs growing out of changing social, and
political and economic conditions.3 4 Some courts have acted as
if these conditions remained stagnant for many decades, for they
have continued to exempt charities from liability on the theory
of public policy.
From the wide differences in the case results dealing with
the liability of charitable institutions, it is evident that there is
a great deal of conflict as to the correct public policy to follow
in this area. It has been stated that non-public policy theories
have little "inherent or real" merit to recommend them and are
but "legal fictions" which the courts have "conceived" to be a
demand of sound public policy. 35
Changing Conditions and Concepts Affecting Immunity
If immunity for charitable institutions is based on "public
policy," it follows that as the conditions upon which the "public
policy" is based changes, so too, should the immunity doctrine.
As one judge so aptly stated it: "Public policy as being in the
public good, unlike the Ten Commandments, is not necessarily
an ever enduring thing, but changes with the times and pro-
spectives." 36
So strong was the public policy for upholding immunity for
charities that frequently the courts not only "rationalized" their
way to the desired results, but even resorted to emotional argu-
ments. Thus a 1918 Kentucky court37 in holding a charitable
hospital immune from liability for negligence to a patient, caus-
ing him injury and death, attacked another court's contrary
opinion under similar facts. It compared liability for charities
to an economic transaction which "reduces the relation of the
parties to a cold proposition of business and to the level of de-
manding of each other an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth."
The court went on to say that such a result was like extracting
from the charity "a pound of flesh."
34 See note 28 supra at 25, 230 P. 2d at 222.
35 Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n., 241 Iowa 1269, 1272, 45 N. W.
2d 151, 153 (1950).
36 Ibid.




The all important factor that caused many courts to estab-
lish immunity for reasons of public policy was the "charitable
and public service features" of the institutions. 38 In balancing
the interests between the injured party and the defendant
charity, the great weight of authority favored the latter, until
recent years.
The prevailing view was that it was better for the public
at large that the individual bear his injury rather than that
charities be liable in tort. The charity of the past, though, was
a very different thing from the modern charity. Except as it was
a part of the Church, it was not organized and depended upon
"human instincts" of individuals and informal groups. 39 It is
evident that the courts of the time did not want to discourage
the "Good Samaritan" by subjecting him to tort damages.
That these charitable institutions were weak and small and
required court coddling is evidenced by the statement of a
Kansas Supreme Court judge when he said that state benevo-
lence can only go so far and private charity must cover the rest.
40
It was his view that to subject charities to "damage suit in-
dustry" would halt or at least make scanty the contributions and
donations to the defendant-Salvation Army and other such in-
stitutions. He casually stated that life was full of risk and it is
better for the individual to assume the risk than for society to
suffer from "a drying up of the springs of eleemosynary sus-
tenance." This reasoning is questionable. It is submitted that
donations would not decrease if the charities assumed an obliga-
tion which would be more in keeping with their generous spirit
of aiding the unfortunate, among whom can certainly be in-
cluded one wrongly or negligently injured.
A later Kansas court, in rejecting the previous reasoning
and in holding a hospital liable in tort, admitted that originally
there was a need for charity treatment of the suffering, which
was then urgent, and said that the general good of society de-
manded encouragement. 41 Also, the concept of government
originally did not include many of the social and welfare func-
tions that we assume today are the government's responsibility.
Immunity was one way to encourage private groups to under-
take these pursuits.
38 Id. at 336, 202 S. W. at 877.
39 See note 28 supra at 35, 230 P. 2d at 228.
40 Webb v. Vought et al., 127 Kan. 799, 801-802, 275 P. 170 (1929).
41 See note 2 supra at 758, 267 P. 2d at 939.
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The courts began to recognize these changes by advocating
varying degrees of immunity. In the famous case of President
and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes42 (the opinion
which Prosser believes dealt a "devastating" blow to the im-
munity doctrine43 ), the judge stated that it was doubtful if the
rule of "full immunity" ever represented the prevailing decision
in the United States. In other words, the immunity doctrine, in
effect, refers to what degree the exemption will be applied to
charities.
The pattern of degrees ranges from complete immunity to
full liability in a growing number of states. In between is a
group of states allowing partial immunity. Included in this in-
termediate group, was Ohio which, until 1956, allowed charitable
immunity as to beneficiaries of the institutions, but imposed
liability as to injured strangers. A stranger was considered to
be a person who receives no benefit from the charity and is not
employed by it. 4 4 On the other hand, a beneficiary was con-
sidered to be one who is receiving some type of benefit from the
charity at the time of the injury.45 The irony of not allowing an
injured beneficiary to recover is that he, least of all, is able to
bear the burden of his injury. This is shown by the very fact
that he is a charity beneficiary.
It is believed that this distinction between strangers and
beneficiaries, though on shaky ground, showed a clear under-
standing of the courts that changing conditions required a chang-
ing public policy. Most significant is the fact that in the past
decade, while several states have moved from an area of im-
munity which was complete to one of partial or even no im-
munity, or from partial to no immunity, no jurisdiction has
moved in the direction of immunity.46
Typical of this trend is California. In a 1951 case, its court
rejected all bases of immunity.47 There the court refused to con-
sider the question of whether the injured plaintiff, a Bible
school student, was a paying or non-paying pupil, but held that
beneficiaries were no longer barred from recovery. It described
the distinction between the class of injured parties as a "fiction."
42 See note 12 supra at 817.
43 Prosser, Torts 787 (2d ed. 1955).
44 Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2, 4 (D. Mo. 1949).
45 See note 30 supra at 132, 70 A. 2d 235.
46 See note 28 supra at 29, 230 P. 2d at 224.
47 Malloy v. Fong, 37 C. 2d 356, 232 P. 2d 241 (1951).
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Also typical of the reversal which the courts have made in
this area, because of new factors and changing conditions, is
Iowa and Ohio. Iowa had for many years followed a rule of
complete immunity for charities. Then in 1950, in Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hospital,48 the court reasoned that charitable in-
stitutions had reached the point where they should bear the
responsibilities of tort liability.
In 1956, the Ohio Supreme Court, in the much discussed
and analyzed case of Avellone v. St. Johns Hospital,4 9 rejected
the last remnant of hospital immunity in this state. While it is
true that the case was decided on the pleadings, the court took
cognizance of the changing concepts as related to this area. It
seems the court wished to leave no doubt that beneficiaries of a
charitable hospital, at least, would now be treated as any other
injured person. More important, the court expressed the view
that charitable hospitals have now come of age and must accept
the responsibility which would subject them to tort liability.
This is evidenced by the court's statement that:
Up to this point in the development of the law, this
court has apparently felt that the benefits to society as a
whole, gained by granting immunity; weighed the former
[charities] right in favor of the latter [plaintiff], and this
was on the ground that such masters were "different from
others," and immunity for them was "a valuable aid in
securing the ends of justice."
In our opinion this conclusion is no longer justified.50
The dwindling immunity in New York has already been
discussed. In 1956, Idaho, too, joined the parade of states aban-
doning immunity, and in 1958, New Jersey, also.51 Significant is
the fact that some states which still adhere to complete immu-
nity, nevertheless recognize that the doctrine which they follow
is no longer applicable. Illustrating this is a recent Wisconsin
Supreme Court case, which in effect stated that if it were not
bound by stare decisis but were deciding tort liability of chari-
ties for the first time, it would give "little weight" to the reasons
48 See note 35 supra at 1274, 45 N. W. 2d at 154.
49 165 0. S. 467, 135 N. E. 2d 410 (1956).
50 Id. at 474, 135 N. E. 2d at 414.
51 Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints, 78 Idaho 60, 297 P. 2d 1041(1956); 3 cases in N. J., Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church; Collopy v.
Newark Eye & Ear Hospital; Benton v. Y. M. C. A. of Westfield; 141 A. 2d
273, 276, 298 (N. J. 1958).
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upholding immunity.52 Admitting the immunity rule to be
"archaic," it felt that it was for the legislature and not the courts
to change the rule.
However, Wisconsin has what it calls a "safe-place" statute
which places a greater standard of care upon owners of publicly-
used buildings to keep such structures safe for passersby and
users. Charities are not immune from it. Thus, where a child
was injured when he pressed against a hospital screen and fell
out, the hospital was held liable for a statutory breach.53 A 1957
case stipulated that although the defendant home for the aged
would not be liable for common law negligence because of the
immunity exception, it must answer where the plaintiff was
injured when she slipped on a waxed floor, the presence of which
was a violation of the "safe-place" statute.
54
A second exception to the complete immunity rule in Wis-
consin is in cases of injuries resulting from nuisances negli-
gently caused. Thus the highest court of the state did not
hesitate to hold a church liable for injuries to the plaintiff re-
sulting from an icy sidewalk.55 These cases and exceptions to
the immunity doctrine clearly show the desire to escape a policy
which the courts themselves recognize as not in keeping with
the times.
The trend illustrated seems to stem from a realization that
general tort principles should prevail even as to charities. In
balancing the interests between the institutions and the injured
individual, public policy today demands protection for the
latter. Supporting this is the fact that the immunity rule is an
exception to tort concepts where the emphasis is on liability
rather than immunity for wrongdoing.,
Also coming into consideration is what is known as the
"Good Samaritan" maxim. As pointed out, an individual may
not be under a duty to act, but when he does act, he must do so
with care or else be subject to liability for his negligent wrong-
doing.57 It is submitted that if there are no exceptions to tort
liability for a private "Good Samaritan," then there is no valid
52 Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 397, 61 N. W. 2d 896, 898
(1953).
53 Wright v. St. Mary's Hospital, 265 Wis. 502, 61 N. W. 2d 900 (1953).
54 Watry v. Carmelite Sisters, 274 Wis. 415, 80 N. W. 2d 397 (1957).
55 See note 52 supra.
56 See note 35 supra at 1274, 45 N. W. 2d at 154.
57 25 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 612, 626 (1950).
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reason why a charitable association should not be treated the
same.
Case after case abandoning the immunity doctrine has em-
phasized that the hardships and burdens of charitable organiza-
tions of the past have to a large extent ceased to exist. Unlike
in former years, they are most certainly in a better position to
bear the loss than the injured individual. The extent to which
charities have grown was acknowledged by one Kansas court
when it stated:
These institutions of today have, in many instances,
grown into enormous businesses, handling large funds, man-
aging and owning vast properties, much of it tax free by
statute, set up by large trusts or foundations enjoying en-
dowments and resources beyond anything thought of when
the matter of immunity was first considered.58
In effect, the court was stressing the fact that in balancing
the interests between the charity and the injured individual, the
former has reached a position where it can now absorb the loss.
Also, it was an admission that the factors affecting the balance
of interests had shifted away from charities.
Very important is the fact that the old fear of depletion of
funds arising from tort damages is no longer strong, in that
insurance against such liability has become widely accepted
and is now available. Insurance has achieved importance in this
area only recently. It is argued by some that charities should
not be further burdened by this sizable expense of operation.
It has been suggested that rather than being detrimental to
charities, the cost of insurance will be more than offset by the
gain of eliminating continuous litigation expenses because of the
unsettled question of immunity versus liability. 59
It is to be remembered that a substantial amount of the
money donated to charity is absorbed not only in strictly chari-
table pursuits, but also for salaries, rents and other overhead
necessary for the operation of the institution. Besides, charities,
no doubt, carry fire insurance on their property, and yet this is
considered a normal part of overhead which few would question
as a necessary expense. Certainly, insurance against tort liability
would also be justified as a necessary expense of operation. The
writer submits that as charities no longer use the horse and
buggy as their means of transportation, likewise, they should
58 See note 41 supra.
59 See note 12 supra at 828.
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not continue to utilize a "horse-and-buggy" method which re-
sults in unjust treatment of an injured party.
The effect of insurance destroys the immunity theory that
the trust property was not to be impaired. Thus the Illinois
Supreme Court set aside its generally-followed trust fund theory
and held a charitable university liable where the university was
insured against liability.60 The court reasoned that the exemp-
tion for charities is not immunity from suit for a tort, but the
protection actually given to the trust fund iself. And liability in-
surance provided the needed protection.
In Maryland, where charitable immunity is recognized, the
state legislature enacted a statute which the courts have inter-
preted to mean that hospitals carrying liability insurance are
estopped to assert immunity to the extent of collectible insur-
ance."' But most of the courts upholding the immunity doctrine
declare that the existence of liability insurance has no effect
whatever on their desired results of finding immunity for chari-
ties. Typical of the reasons advanced by these courts for the
non-effect of insurance is that a plaintiff negligently injured by
an insured charity would recover, while a plaintiff injured in
and by an uninsured charity would not, and that such a distinc-
tion has no logical basis. 2
Admittedly such reasoning logically follows the immunity
concept of tort liability. However, its validity cannot depend on
logic when the premise upon which that logic is based rests on
questionable ground. Such reasoning is predicated on the validity
of the immunity doctrine itself, the very applicability of which
is here being questioned.
So important has insurance become today that many courts
take judicial notice of different types of insurance, including
liability insurance. One court so doing suggested that this was
just evidence of the changing times as related to the "business,
social, economic and legal worlds." 6 3 It was a clear statement
that financial encouragement and protection for charitable in-
stitutions, to the detriment of injured-individuals, were no
longer necessary or desirable.
The changing conditions and concepts described required a
60 Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. 2d 81 (1950).
61 Gorman v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 210 Md. 1, 121 A. 2d
812 (1956).
62 Cristini v. Griffin Hospital, 134 Conn. 282, 57 A. 2d 262 (1948).
03 See note 35 supra at 1273, 45 N. W. 2d at 154.
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changing public policy. As illustrated, many courts have taken
cognizance of such changes and have accordingly rejected the
immunity doctrine in varying degrees. If the law is not to re-
main stagnant in this area, it is up to the courts, which first
recognized immunity, to now abandon it as not being applicable
to our times.
The Abandonment of Charitable Immunity
There is little doubt but that the abandonment of charitable
immunity is supported by the great weight of authority among
legal scholars. The writer agrees that this is a correct view. The
natural question stemming from such an opinion is to what ex-
tent charitable immunity should be rejected by the courts.
Admittedly, the changing social, economic and political con-
ditions previously discussed are more applicable to certain
associations, charitable in nature, than to others. Thus different
institutions vary as to size, financial worth, purpose, services
rendered, donations received, etc. Many present day hospitals
are large and financially secure while others are not; like
distinctions can be made among different churches, schools,
Y. M. C. A. and Red Cross groups, etc.
Should the courts recognize these differences when con-
sidering the issue of liability versus immunity for these chari-
ties? It is the writer's belief that they should not, and that the
immunity exception should be abandoned as to all charities.
Such an opinion was set forth in Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memo-
rial Hospital,64 where the Washington Supreme Court stated
that public policy, as related to this area under consideration,
"must be based on general conditions and the average situation."
It went on to state that it cannot "be designed to meet excep-
tional cases or deal with particular instances of hardship." These
words were uttered by the Washington Court in overturning
the charitable immunity which had been the public policy fol-
lowed there for many years. In that case, the defendant non-
profit hospital was held liable for injuries inflicted by its servants
upon a paying patient of the hospital.6 5
Two years later, the same Court, in Lyon v. Tumwater
Evangelical Free Church,66 was faced with the question of tort
liability of a church. The court held the church immune from
64 43 Wash. 2d 162, 171, 260 P. 2d 765, 770 (1953).
65 Ibid.
66 47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P. 2d 128 (1955).
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liability for injuries to the plaintiff, one of several children
transported in a bus to and from Sunday School without charge,
the accident being caused by the alleged negligence of the bus
driver.
In the Pierce case, the court rendered an opinion which in
effect stated that the new public policy, as illustrated by the
above quotation, would, as it should, be applicable to all chari-
ties. The court in deciding the liability of the defendant hospital
recognized that all charities would be affected by the, decision
when it said: "nor do we overlook the fact that the principles
with which we are dealing have application also to such organiza-
tion as Y. M. C. A.'s, Y. W. C. A.'s and Red Cross." IN
It appears to the writer that the Court in the Lyon case did
what constitutes a judicial "somersault." In refusing to extend
liability to the defendant church, it limited its holding of the
Pierce case to hospitals only. The court suggests that the Pierce
case did not reject charitable immunity but rather "modified"
it.68
Perhaps the difference in the results of the two cases rests
not on the different character of the defendant charities involved
but rather on the now outmoded policy of distinguishing be-
tween a beneficiary and a stranger in order to determine who
may recover against the charity. In the Pierce case, the plaintiff
was a paying patient or a stranger to the charity hospital, while
in the Lyon case, the plaintiff was a beneficiary of the church
and therefore a member of a class which was frequently barred
from recovery against a charitable institution. It is significant
that the Court in refusing to extend liability to the defendant
church simply made a statement to that effect and failed to dis-
tinguish between hospitals and other charitable institutions such
as churches.
As said, the Ohio Supreme Court in 1956, in the Avellone
case rejected the last remnant of hospital partial immunity in
Ohio.69 And this partial immunity had been applicable to all
charitable institutions in Ohio.70 In the Avellone case, the Court,
limited by the pleadings in the case, stated in effect that "hos-
pitals not for profit" will now be liable under the respondeat
superior doctrine for the torts of its servants and employees.
67 See note 64 supra.
68 See note 66 supra at 204, 287 P. 2d at 129.
69 See note 49 supra.
70 Waddell v. Y. W. C. A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N. E. 2d 140 (1938).
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Since the Avellone case, the Ohio Supreme Court has made
no further pronouncements which would suggest whether or not
the immunity doctrine is to be abandoned as to charitable in-
stitutions other than hospitals. However, recently, an Ohio Com-
mon Pleas Court was faced with the question of tort liability of
a church in the case of Hunsche v. Alter.71 The court drew an
analogy between the two previously cited Washington cases and
the Avellone case with the case it was now deciding. Interpret-
ing the second Washington case as limiting charitable liability
only to hospitals, it thereupon held the defendant church im-
mune from tort liability.
Admitting that the Washington court failed to state why a
distinction should be made between hospitals and other chari-
table institutions, the court then proceeded to make such a dis-
tinction. Without intending to, nor perhaps realizing that it had
done so, the court actually hit the heart of the matter as to why
no distinction should be made at all between the various types
of charities. The court suggests that modern hospitals are in
better position than other types of charities. But it fails to con-
sider the fact that all hospitals are not necessarily in the same
"desired" position. Also, there is among the different types of
charities--churches, schools, hospitals, Y. M. C. A. groups, etc.
wide differences in relative positions.
The early pronouncements of immunity were rendered as to
hospitals. Later, the courts upholding immunity did not hesitate
to extend the doctrine to all charitable institutions, believing
that they should be treated alike. Thus a Missouri court, in Eads
v. Y. W. C. A., recognizing the generally-followed immunity for
charitable hospitals, said: "There can be no logical reason
why the same rule of exemption applied to charitable hospitals
should not apply to a charitable association such as the
Y. W. C. A." 7 2
If the reason for extending the immunity rule to all charities
was a recognition that they are of the same character and
should be given equal treatment in the law, there is no justifica-
tion in attempting to distinguish between them now. And as
many courts are now holding hospitals liable in tort at the
present time, then it follows that the general rules of tort liability
should now be extended to all forms of charitable institutions.
To abandon the immunity doctrine as to hospitals only, or
71 76 Ohio L. Abs. 68, 145 N. E. 2d 368 (C. P. 1957).
72 Eads v. Y. W. C. A., 325 Mo. Sup. 577, 591, 29 S. W. 2d 701, 707 (1930).
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as to other hand-picked charities, and to continue to apply the
doctrine to the other associations, would be an approval of ar-
bitrary legal standards. The only valid reason for making a
distinction between the various charities is the ability or in-
ability of such institutions to bear the cost of either the actual
tort damages or liability insurance premiums.
If the courts make such a distinction, they will be closing
their eyes to important realities of tort liability principles. It is
conceded that charities bestow many good deeds and function
for the most honorable of services. But so do many private in-
dividuals act as Good Samaritans! And the fact of the matter is
that these Good Samaritans and any other private group or cor-
poration are liable for their negligent and tortious conduct, re-
gardless of their financial status. It must be remembered that
liability is generally based on fault and not on purpose of action
or financial ability.
Finally, the abandonment of immunity as to a particular
charity-hospitals-is an admission of the nonapplicability of
the doctrine altogether. As the Washington court in the Pierce
case said:
Ordinarily when a court decides to modify or abandon
a court made rule of long standing, it starts out by saying
that "the reason for the rule no longer exists." In this case,
it is correct to say that the "reason originally given for the
rule of immunity never did exist." 73
The nonapplicability of immunity to one charity reaches all
charities, for if it never existed for hospitals, neither did it exist
for any other charity. And neither should it now.
Conclusion
Exemption from tort liability is often referred to as the
"immunity rule." As pointed out earlier, immunity is not a rule
but an exception, the rule being liability for negligent or tortious
conduct. It is this rule of liability rather than immunity which
the law emphasizes. Unless good reasons exist to the contrary,
such emphasis should be maintained.
The theories used to support charitable immunity were a
means to a desired result. But a result of immunity is no longer
desired because of changed conditions which include, among
other factors, the growth of charities, the availability of liability
insurance, and changing public policies. Most important is the
73 See note 64 supra at 167, 260 P. 2d at 768.
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modern tendency of the law to shift the burden from the
innocent victim to the community at large, and to distribute
the losses incurred by individuals through the operation of an
enterprise among all who benefit by it rather than among those
who sustained injury.74
That charitable institutions continue to perform beneficial
and worthwhile functions in our society is not denied. In fact
such undertakings are to be encouraged. But men and corpora-
tions alike are required to be just before being charitable.75
Charity, therefore, is no defense; charity refers to motive and
not duty. And like the private Good Samaritan, charities should
be held to a duty which makes them answerable for their tortious
and negligent acts.
The primary function of the law is justice, and when a prin-
ciple of the law no longer serves justice, it should be discarded.
It is hoped that more courts will recognize that immunity does
not serve that end, and will accordingly abandon immunity as
to all charities.
Charity suffereth long and is kind, but . . . it cannot be
careless. When it is, it ceases to be kindness and becomes
actionable wrongdoing. 76
74 Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart, 24 N. J. 549, 565, 133 A. 2d 12, 22
(1957).
75 Anno., 25 A. L. R. 2d 29, 76 (1952).
76 See note 12 supra at 813.
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